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September 01, 2005
Gellner's Words and Things
I've been meaning to link to this for a while. It's Kieran Setiya's review of Ernest Gellner's recently rereleased (that's what they used to call it on TOTP) Words and Things (which I've now added to the "to read, possibly on the subway" pile under the window in my apartment.)
Kieran begins ominously:
Philosophy has never recovered from the damage done to its image around the middle of the last century: it came to seem dull, insipid and mechanical, a pedantic exploration of how language works.
I found this ominous because I've always been drawn to linguistic philosophy. I remember, as an undergraduate, reading Tarski's "Semantic Conception of Truth" and Hempel's "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" and being stunned by the way in which analysis and attention to language allowed progress to be made on apparently intractable problems. Where Kieran saw philosophy as in danger of being "dull, insipid and mechanical, a pedantic exploration of how language works", I saw it as exposing a gap in the armour of every tough problem. Exploration of how language works need be neither pedantic, nor trivial, but questions about language often look more tractable than questions about free will, or induction or consciousness or values and it's common for results in the philosophy of language to have application in other areas (recent examples have included externalism, possible world semantics and context-sensitivity.) When Al Hájek gave his Heuristics paper at the ANU a few weeks back (it's a paper that lists heuristics for coming up with philosophical ideas) I thought that one thing that could be added was "do some philosophy of language and try using what you've learned when working elsewhere."
Yet Gellner's book sounds fun anyway:
you can see why it was explosive, with its combination of wit and flagrant disavowal of interpretive charity. Gellner is happy to attribute bad motives, bad ideas and sheer confusions to the philosophers he dislikes, and he is often very funny in doing so.
And there's often more need for us to read the work of our critics than that of our friends. This was a little close to the bone, for instance:
Academic environments are generally characterised by the presence of people who claim to understand more than in fact they do. Linguistic Philosophy has produced a great revolution, generating people who claim not to understand what in fact they do. Some achieve great virtuosity at it. Any beginner in philosophy can manage not to understand, say, Hegel, but I have heard people who were so advanced that they knew how not to understand writers of such limpid clarity as Bertrand Russell or A. J. Ayer.(Gellner)
I find it so tempting to think of myself as just having higher than average standards for the application of the word "understanding", but then i) wouldn't that make me rather like some whiney old behaviourist, asking for behavioural criteria for the application of words before they'll admit them to polite company and ii) if everyone else was using "understand" differently, wouldn't it be me that was mistaken about what the word means? I'd be like one of those students that defends their paper by saying "I know I wrote the crazy thing, but what it meant was the correct thing." Damn.
Well, the weather is closing down already here in Alberta - I'll be spending some time on the subway with Words and Things.
UPDATE: Dave Chalmers has pointed out the following critique of the book which makes, as Dave says in the comments, good companion reading.
Posted by logican at September 1, 2005 01:45 PM
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Comments
I think that your suggestion for a philosophical heuristic is not specific to philosophy of language and, indeed, is not a heuristic only for philosophy. Only learning about stuff that fits into whatever the modern, narrowly defined view of what your subject is, vastly limits what you can do. I quite like learning about subjects that some may consider vastly different from my own, since people in that area often have radically different perspectives on what is important and can provide a useful new angle on whatever problem I am working on.
Posted by: Jon
at September 1, 2005 10:43 PM
I've certainly noticed that last thing from time to time - it's a nice cop out to be able to claim not even to understand what one's critic is trying to say (and thus implying that the critic doesn't really have a point).
And I think I generally sympathize with you on the use of philosophy of language. That's why I may be sitting in on a semantics class or two in the linguistics department this semester.
Posted by: Kenny Easwaran at September 2, 2005 02:47 AM
I came to Words and Things in part by way of this extremely engaging critique of it by T.P. Uschanov. Good companion reading, I'd say. Oswald Hanfling's book defending ordinary language philosophy (Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of our Tongue) is also worth reading.
Posted by: djc at September 2, 2005 08:11 AM
Thanks for the link!
A small clarification: when I said that the linguistic revolution made philosophy seem pedantic and dull, I didn't mean that it seems/seemed that way to ME, but to the masses.
One piece of mildly confirming evidence: it is still routine to hear analytic philosophy identified with logical positivism or the ordinary language approach, which suggests that it stopped being absorbed into the general consciousness roughly at the point that Gellner attacks. Later developments were never noticed. I don't know if this is true; but it would explain a lot. Even if its effect on the intellectual quality of philosophy was positive, there might still be reason to regret the linguistic turn.
Posted by: Kieran Setiya at September 2, 2005 10:54 AM
Hi Kieran! Point taken about the correct way to interpret you - sorry for the misrepresentation.
I think you're right that there's a portion of the academy that identifies philosophy with logical positivism. I still run into undergraduates who have been taking courses in literary theory and and expect philosophers to be facists.
I also think there's a portion of the academy (and the rest of the world) that associates something like logical positivism with either common sense, or science very broadly construed, and sees philosophy as a kind of air-headed attempt to abuse it. Check out the Guardian's Bad Science column here. That week's entry includes the following:
Last week I asked: what's the most stupid thing anyone has said to you about science at a party? And it would seem that the great British sport of moron-baiting is more popular than ever. Lots of you encountered philosophers. Guy Davidson was told that "science doesn't tell you about the real world, only an ideal version of it". Yup. Well, light still travels faster than sound no matter how you look at it. Balthazar Florentin-Lee met someone who told him his discussion was flawed because it was "based only on logic" and someone whose email I lost got: "Logic isn't real, you can prove anything you want with logic. It's meaningless." Edwin Whiting was told that "science is how the devil perverts God's will" (bravo!), and the popular idea that "science is a way of life you choose just like religion" (via Yaniv Chen) perhaps explains why party philosophers then moved on to "not everything is scientific" (via Heather Bayley) and "science can't tell us everything" (via Conor McGeown). We never said it could.
Man, as if we didn't know it after the recent Silly Talk about Philosophy thread on TAR, we have a huge image problem.
As you might have expected though, despite his distain of philosophers in general, the author of Bad Science has a fondness for Popper anyway, and writes:
If you are a purveyor of bad science, be afraid. If you are on the side, of light and good, be vigilant: and for the love of Karl Popper, email me every last instance you find of this evil.
For the love of Hans Havlorson, more light and good all round please!
Posted by: Gillian Russell at September 4, 2005 09:28 PM